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War Finance (France)
By Patrice Baubeau
Though it entered war with an already important public debt, France managed its growth in ways comparable to that of other main warring
powers, mixing monetary financing, internal and external debt. Monetary financing was made possible by the 5 August 1914 convertibility
suspension, while strong British and, later on, American support avoided a decline of the exchange rate before the end of the war. State
debt purchases were transformed into a patriotic act through intense marketing, but it did not prevent a slow increase in interest rates,
albeit a rudimentary circuit policy, leading to a growing share of short-term debt.
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Finance and war issues have long been mutually coextensive: states needed finance mostly to fund war, while one of war’s main aims was access to
tributes, taxes or plunder. The effect of military spending upon the state’s size was limited during the 19th century in Western Europe, and opened the
opportunity to non-military public expenses growth, thanks to a long period of relative peace.[1] Nevertheless, this relative decline in military spending
was not as pronounced and as beneficial to state finance in France as in most neighbouring countries, for two main reasons: slow demographic
growth and lost wars. Indeed, from 1813 on, France was defeated in many conflicts – 1813-1814, 1815, 1870-1871 – and ended up burdened by huge
payments to its opponents, to which new military expenses added, particularly in the decades following its 1871 defeat (Table 1).[2]
Army expenses Navy expenses Total Armed Peace
in milliondollars in % of countriestotal in milliondollars in % of countriestotal in milliondollars in % of countriestotal
France 6,105 22.6 2,463 23.0 8,568 22.7
Italy 2,163 8.0 847 7.9 3,010 8.0
Russia 6,150 22.7 1,431 13.4 7,581 20.1
United
Kingdom 4,373 16.2 4,028 37.6 8,401 22.2
Austria-
Hungary 2,478 9.2 296 2.8 2,774 7.3
Germany 5,782 21.4 1,652 15.4 7,434 19.7
Total 27,051 10,717 37,768
Table 1: The costs of the “armed peace” to the larger European nations, 1873-1913, in million dollars[3]
Thus, when France faced the possibility of a European war in the early 1910s, it bore the largest public debt in the world, but also a strong experience
regarding war finance. Moreover, many measures had already been planned or even implemented in order to fund the war, preserve the French
payment system and avoid a dire financial crisis in case of a general conflict. From this perspective, World War I (WW1) finance in France started
years ahead of August 1914 through provisions and planning. Nevertheless, all plans were overwhelmed by the unexpected costs and length of the
conflict. At the end of the war France implemented a disastrously inefficient financial policy, wasting many of the benefits of a costly victory. These
issues were heavily documented during the interwar period thanks to political skirmishes, parliamentary debates, American foundations and persistent
financial conflicts between foes but also between former allies.
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In 1913, the French state was heavily indebted, over 33 billion French francs (FF),[4] a debt accumulated for a great part to prepare for colonial and
continental war or to pay for defeat. To be sure, the cost of this debt was limited due to the huge amount of French savings and the general trust
towards French public finance, mirrored in the low interest rates paid by the state on its debt. Moreover, as the second (next to London) financial
market in the world, and the first for public securities, Paris offered the best possible financial conditions to the French state. Nevertheless, the
amount of fiscal resources devoted to debt interest payments stood at 34 percent in 1913. Worse though, the increase in military expenses following
the first Moroccan crisis, in 1905, had led to temporary measures and special Treasury accounts that dissimulated the real budgetary conditions. The
rising international tensions after 1911 further increased military expenses, while Parliament proved incapable of voting a budget on schedule. The
state functioned mainly upon “provisional twelfth”, i.e. monthly sums calculated from the previous year’s budget before the current year’s budget was
voted. The situation got worse in 1913, with the “three years” law extending compulsory military service. All this led to the accumulation of over 1.2
billion French francs in floating debt to be consolidated. This process was hampered by political strife over tax issues, crucially the tax on rentes – the
French state perpetually consolidated loans that had been tax-free since 1797. Finally, a consolidation loan was offered to the public in July 1914
(Table 4). It was too late to tidy up public finance, but left the syndicated banks burdened with unsold rentes when the crisis broke out. Besides, this
explains why from 1911 on budget figures are both contradictory and unreliable, a situation that further deteriorated during the war, until 1926/1928
(Table 2).
But this liability side was somehow balanced by a favourable asset side, partly the result of the slow French demographic movement and partly the
result of a voluntary policy. Thanks to the fertility decline and a thrifty mentality, which led to a long-term balance of payment surplus, France was the
second creditor nation with over 45 billion francs in foreign assets in 1914.[5] This position had already been used to settle foreign transactions in 1870
and fund the 1871 Emprunt de libération nationale, and in 1914 the foreign securities portfolio was seen as a major asset to collateralize or finance
foreign loans.[6]
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Foreignloans Totalresources Ordinaryexpenses Militaryexpenses Otherexpenses Debtcharge Totalexpenses
Totalresourcesminus totalexpenses
1911 4.7     4.7 4.5    4.5
1912 4.9     4.9 4.7    4.7
1913 5.1     5.1 5    5
1914 4.2 3.9 1.9 0.5 0.05 10.55 2 6.5 0.5 1.4 10.4 0.15
1915 4.1 1.2 8 6.7 2.8 22.8 2.5 14.7 3.1 1.8 22.1
1916 4.9 2.4 12.4 5.8 8.8 34.3 2.8 23.9 6.8 3.3 36.8
1917 6.6 5 12.6 5.7 11.9 41.8 4.1 28.7 7 4.8 44.6
1918 7.2 4.8 3.7 22.5 8.7 46.9 5.4 36.1 8.1 7 56.6
1919 11.6 8.4 26.2 7.3 11.3 64.8 9.2 18.2 18.9 7.9 54.2 10.6
1920 20.1 0.8 3.5 35.5 -0.5 59.4 11.4 7.6 27.4 11.7 58.1
1921 23.1 -2 10.3 9.1 2.7 43.2 9.9 6 24.1 11.1 51.1
1922 24.2     24.2 7.7 5 22.6 13.6 48.9 -24.7
1923 27.7     27.7 6.5 4.8 21.7 12.8 45.8 -18.1
1924 31.1     31.1     40.2
Table 2: General outlook on state expenses and resources, 1911-1924, in billion French francs[7]
Caption: (a) Banque de France and Banque de l’Algérie; (b) rentes and Crédit national included. These figures are a best-guess: many expenses
were reported from one year to the other, and the global matching between expenses and resources was extended over several years thanks to
Treasury special accounts and operations and various bank advances and short-term loans, most of which do not appear here. It is not even possible
to arithmetically balance resources and expenses over several years because of the biases introduced by the war and post-war inflation.
Another “liability” was the Banque de France (BDF). Its metallic reserve was by far the world’s largest, although it still contained a large proportion of
silver, and its ability to circulate a large number of banknotes under the inconvertibility regime had been fully demonstrated between 1870 and 1878.[8]
This huge “war chest” was supplemented by the also very large gold and silver circulation and hoardings in France, also the world’s largest.[9]
Consequently, the BDF had been at the heart of war planning in three different directions. First, innovative credit provisions had been designed to fund
credit-based supply stocks in military strongholds through discount (revolving-credit) mechanisms. Second, the 3 July 1877 law, a clear by-product of
the Franco-Prussian war, allowed requisitions (of animals, vehicles and so on) to be paid for by Treasury bonds, a provision partially enforced from
August 1914 to January 1915, when full monetary payments were resumed.[10] Third, secret provisions between the state (Treasury) and the BDF
had been negotiated in 1890 and renewed every six months.[11] A longer-term convention was negotiated in the aftermath of the 1911 crisis to provide
2.9 billion francs in short-term credits to the state in case of a war outbreak, and to circulate low-denomination banknotes to make for the eventual
vanishing of fine silver and gold coins from circulation.[12] As Bernard Serrigny wrote, doubtlessly echoing contemporary beliefs: “This power of the
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Banque constitutes our true war chest,”[13] echoing the inaugural speech of Georges Pallain (1847-1923) as the BDF’s governor, 4 January 1898: “in
case of national alarm, [the BDF is] the supreme guarantee of the patria’s salvation.”[14]
Contrary to Norman Angell’s idea that a general war was economically impossible because the economy rested on trust-dependent credit,[15] some
contemporary authors concluded the opposite. Serrigny thus wrote in 1909, about a French-German war to come, that “the fight as organized by the
two opponents is economically and socially possible, but at the price of enormous sacrifices during the conflict and of very real sufferings after peace
is concluded.”[16] But the author also tried to show, drawing from the 1871 German example, that an economically developed country would draw no
economic profit from territorial gains. Thus, war, while becoming costlier, had to aim at other goals than wealth – an outcome that was overlooked
before and during the conflict. Looking at the different ways to fund the war, Serrigny also correctly foresaw that taxes would not be up to the task. To
most, the solution laid in debt flotation, both at home and abroad, but inflation played a key role.
The Treasury expenses between 1914 and 1919 (demobilization year) were above 200 billion francs (in nominal value) i.e. about twice the nominal
value of the 1913 GDP and about six times the amount of total Treasury expenses in normal times. They were mainly military in nature. And this does
not even account for war-related post-1919 expenses (see Table 2). The breakdown of Treasury receipts clearly reveals the perilous wartime
experience of French finance.
When war broke out, fiscal reforms had already been implemented in relation to military expenses: taxation on financial assets was a key political
issue in 1913-1914 and again during and after the war, the reason for several cabinet resignations. It was related to the income tax issue, fiercely
debated in the years preceding the war, a measure finally adopted 15 July 1914. During the debates, few had failed to note that it had been adopted in
the UK in 1798 to pay for the French wars. This most important fiscal innovation had to be implemented in a country at war, and thus came to play an
important role only in the following years, as is apparent in Table 3. Indeed, as a percentage of all fiscal resources, the growth of income tax, that was
first implemented to a very limited scale in 1916 and came to fruition in 1917, barely compensated the decrease of the “four old women” (namely, the
taxes on real estate, taxes on movable property, patent (professional tax) and taxes on doors and windows). This means that the bulk of the fiscal
effort came through new exceptional taxations – i.e. exceptional indirect taxes and war profits taxation.
1893 1903 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921
Direct taxes (a) 497 542 647 658 553 579 625 362 361 289 551
Indirect Taxes (b)2,000 2,061 2,889 2,293 2,260 2,943 3,650 3,753 6,286 9,557 10,607
Monopolies (c) 632 798 1,035 931 852 943 1,109 1,154 1,631 2,502 1,711
State property 42 51 62 124 186 240 254 284 100 144 113
Income Tax 33 201 513 869 712 1,645
War Profits Tax 634 1,780 1,725 2,937 3,169
Other and sundry 197 216 470 N/A 466 N/A N/A N/A 1,543 2,240 2,898
Total 3,368 3,668 5,103 4,006 4,317 4,738 6,473 7,846 12,515 18,381 20,694
Table 3: Fiscal resources, in million French francs[17]
Caption: (a) the “four old women” (taxes on real estate, taxes on movable property, patent (professional tax), taxes on doors and windows,) and
assimilated; (b) Registration, stamps, excise, customs, etc.; (c) Post office, matches, tobacco, powder, telephone and telegraph, etc. As indicated for
Table 2, these figures must be taken cum grano salis.
The war profits taxation (extraordinary tax on supplementary war profits), though, did not aim only at raising the state’s revenues: it also was
associated with the distribution of sacrifices among the population as well as a “moralizing” tax. It is a rare case of an important fiscal measure that
was adopted by a unanimous Parliament, in face of growing public discontent against war profiteers. Its impact was important both from the point of
view of state finances and of its redistributive effects. Albeit a complex system of annual and delayed payments, the taxes collected between 1916
and 1921 amounted to about 10 percent of French GDP; the unanticipated result of the failure to take inflation into account.[18] Nevertheless, taxes
fell short of financing even the civil expenses between 1914 and 1922. War expenses had to be funded otherwise.
Loans are a natural way to finance an exceptional event that exceeds normal receipts (or even reduce them) and that may be amortized on a longer
period than the annual budget. But resorting to debt means also finding ways to please the savers and investors. There are three conditions for that:
propose a high enough rate of return; offer a sound repayment guarantee; organize a securities market that allows easy liquidation. But as the war
wore on, a fourth condition developed: the unit of value stability. It was thus a crucial circumstance for the success of French public loans that
exchange rates were stabilized during the war, thanks to UK and US policy, although France developed a growing commercial deficit, especially with
neutral countries and the United States. From 1915 to 1920, six loans were floated (Table 4).
Dateoffered Price1 Price2 Notionalrate in % Yieldin % Par-valueSubscribed Money Valuein 000 FF Modes of payment
1 2 3 4
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Total 72,904 55,762,560 23,772 5,998 1,862
24,130
(43%)
Redeemable 19/2/1920 100.00 101.00 5 5.75 15,941 15,940,678 8,226 612 67 7,035(44%)
Loan of 1920 20/10/1920 100.00 101.15 6 6.00 28,088 28,088,861 4,136 354 12,320 11,278(40%)
Post-War




1914 7/7/1914 3.5 3.85 805 732
Grand Total 117,737 100,522 36,134 6,964 14,249 42,443
Table 4: Permanent War Loans (emprunts), 1915-1921, in million francs (unless specified)[19]
Caption: Price 1: price for full cash payment; Price 2: price for instalments payment; Yield calculated on cash payment. Modes of payment: 1: Paid in
National Defence Treasury Bills (Bons de la Défense Nationale). 2: Paid in National Defence Bonds (Obligations de la Défense Nationale). 3: Paid in
old Rentes etc. 4: Paid in cash (share of money value in cash, in percent). The “money value” column gives the gross receipt of the loan (neat value =
gross value minus 1+2+3) and is in thousand francs. Yields are indicative.
As the table demonstrates, the proportion paid in cash declined steadily during the war, meaning that savers and investors were swapping debts,
further reducing the net resources of the Treasury. Besides, the lowering in interest rate from 1915-1916 to 1917-1918 appears as purely nominal:
since the securities were offered well below par, the actual yield was much higher. In sum, albeit vigorous propaganda,[20] interest rates rose and
French investors swapped shorter-term lower-yield bonds for longer-term higher yields securities.
The second orthodox route to debt is to tap into foreign capital, a move the government would have resisted before the war, but which appeared to be
necessary as soon as it broke out. The first reason was that the war provoked an immediate freezing of the international payments system operated in
London: it was thus crucial to find resources directly in the supplying countries. Second, the sudden occupational shift of the population and the loss of
ten of the most productive departments to the German forces led to a dramatic decline in output that had to be compensated for through imports, on
an unprecedented scale. As soon as August 1914, loans proposals were made in the US, but the US government refused that JP Morgan lend to
France. The British government stepped in and in the spring of 1915, the US government authorized France to float loans on Wall Street. From then
on, foreign loans escalated, financed by massive foreign assets sales, while French gold was largely retained in France. Nevertheless, in the spring of
1917, French saleable assets were running short, and the US stepped into the alliance just in time to supplement declining private sources of funds
(Table 5).
Henceforth, allied states’ loans clearly dominated and, after the war, France never found such a ready access to foreign markets as she had
experienced in the wake of both 1815 and 1871 defeats, but relied on the strong relationship built with a few prominent banks, most notably JP
Morgan. Indeed, foreign debt had become a handicap to any sound financial policy. By its sheer size it represented a permanent menace on the
French franc exchange rate while exacting a huge cost on public finances, which forced the state to resort to unorthodox methods to fund its budget:
money supply was centre stage.






Perpetual 21,922 32,889 43,608 51,278 91,988 88,366 102,073 100,438 656 4,587
Term 10,658 11,384 11,139 11,172 11,188 6,378 33,307 43,793 292 2,638
Total Funded Debt 32,580 32,800 44,273 54,747 62,450 103,176 104,744 135,380 144,231 948 7,225
Annual Increase 220.00 11,473 10,474 7,703 40,726 1,568 30,636 8,851
Floating Debt
Bank of France 3,900 5,000 7,500 12,500 17,150 25,600 26,600 24,600 738
Bank of Algeria 75 25 85 215 235
Total Bank Loans 3,900 5,075 7,525 12,585 17,365 25,835 26,600 24,600 738
Annual Increase 1,175 2,450 5,060 4,780 8,470 765 -2,000
Treasury Bills 427 2,046 7,006 12,618 19,551 22,918 47,934 51,191 60,362 3,978
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Other 1,181 752 140 171 211 504 1,639 1,880 2,987 99
Total Treasury 1,608 2,798 7,146 12,789 19,762 23,422 49,573 53,071 63,349 4,077
Annual Increase 1,190 4,348 5,643 6,973 3,660 26,151 3,498 10,278
Total Floating
Debt 1,608 6,698 12,221 20,314 32,347 40,787 75,408 79,671 87,949 18 4,815
Total Internal Debt 34,188 39,498 56,494 75,061 94,797 143,963 180,152 215,051 232,180 966 2,040
Foreign Debt
USA Nation 5,853 10,489 16,500 16,500 17,356
USA Market 207 400 2,323 3,330 3,064 1,929 1,246 1,190 56
Total USA 207 400 2,323 9,183 13,553 18,429 17,746 18,546 56
UK Nation 726 3,354 7,897 10,594 11,463 11,979 14,279
UK Market 303 845 1,766 2,127 1,891 2,147 1,930 1,728 01
Total UK 303 1,571 5,120 10,024 12,485 13,610 13,909 16,007 01
Other 196 1,452 1,541 1,215 1,010 60
Total Foreign Debt 510 1,971 7,443 19,403 27,490 33,580 32,870 35,563 317
Annual Increase 1,461 5,472 11,960 8,087 6,090 -710 2,693
Grand Total 34,188 40,008 58 465 82,504 114,200 171,453 213,732 247,921 267,743 966 12,357
Annual Increase 18,457 24,039 31,696 57,253 42,279 34,189 19,822
Table 5: French national debt, million French francs, as of 31 December (unless specified)[21]
Caption: Foreign debt at historical value.
As is shown in Table 2, long-term debts and fiscal resources could not meet the level of expenses necessitated by a total war over four years long.
The difference was paid for by printing money and short-term debt – i.e. monetary resources – that led to inflation. The phenomenon was completely
new, since it never took the accelerating pace of previous monetary crises (1719-1720, 1792-1797) leading to a final crash, but was kept in check by
state controls, a circuit policy[22] and an enduring – if shaken – trust of the French people in their currency. Thus, money supply and prices increased
about four-fold during the war, and 25 percent more during the post-war era, leading to Poincaré’s stabilization of the franc in 1928 at 20 percent of its
pre-war value in gold.[23]
This resource came in three forms: first, a transitory one, was the use of Treasury notes to pay for military supplies, a very inconvenient payment
system that was discontinued early in 1915; second, a very durable one that became a key political issue: the “advances” (renewable short-term loans)
by the Banque de France and the Banque de l’Algérie (Tables 2 and 5); and third, the development of a floating debt, i.e. a short-term debt (three
months to one year maturity) that became a natural outlet for the liquidity in excess within the French economy. The floating debt was transformed in a
propaganda tool by the cunning name change that came in September 1914, which transformed overnight the Treasury Bonds in National Defence
Bonds. The success was such that small denominations – as small as 5 and 20 FF – were decided in 1915, and a shorter maturity, one month, was
introduced in April 1918. Thus, this short-term debt was essentially a roll-over debt that could be only partially consolidated into the annual perpetual
flotation and necessitated enough public trust to have them redeemed and reissued at each fixed maturity.[24]
Year Fiscal resources in % Monetary resources in %Debt resources in %
1914 40 55 5
1915 18 40 42
1916 14 43 43
1917 15 43 42
1918 15 48 37
1919 18 54 29
Table 6: Breakout of war finance resources[25]
It remains common to read that taxes financed 4 percent of French war expenses,[26] a good reason why inflation was untameable after the war.
However the way this figure is calculated is problematic. Bertrand Blancheton, concentrating on 1914-1918, found that taxes accounted for 15 percent
of public expenses, a close call to Georges Henri Soutou’s at 14 percent.[27] Secondary sources (Table 6) give comparable figures that considerably
reduce the discrepancy between France and other warring countries. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the conflict did not entail large and
enduring consequences on French finance. Three of them, among many, are outstanding and show that, in many respects, the French financial
situation resembled more that of Germany than that of the UK.
First, the war proved very detrimental to the Paris financial market: it never recovered its former glory – it was even overtaken in quantitative terms by
Amsterdam during most of the interwar period – but its relative decline reinforced the relative weight of the banking sector to the market finance
sector, a trait that endured until today.[28] The birth of new banks, especially semi-public banks, during or immediately after the war (Crédit national,[29]
3.3. The monetary resource
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BNFCE and Crédit populaire) reinforced that shift towards bank-based finance.
Second, the war was instrumental in the development of banking accounts in the French population. This stemmed first from the “circuit policy”,
designed to sterilize excesses in the money supply in order to reduce the inflationary gap, a policy that was also furthered by the 1917 creation of
“Chèques postaux” (Postal bank current accounts) and the payment of war pensions and damage reparations by checks. Thus, the monetary patterns
strongly evolved, with the vanishing of gold and silver coins, and the growing use of banknotes and deposit money.
Third, monetary finance proved very durable. After the large debt issues of 1919 to 1924, the Crédit national had to rely, to pay for the war damages
indemnities, upon the Treasury resources, which themselves were very much related to the BDF’s advances and the floating debt. Such large money
issuance explains how France repaid its large internal debt: through inflation. From 1914 to 1919, prices had been multiplied by 3.6 to four, and in
1926, by about five,[30] i.e. the devaluation factor adopted by the 26 June 1928 stabilization law creating the new gold-based “Franc Poincaré”. These
lessons of inflation-financed and erased debt were not to be lost a decade later.
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